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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF IDAHO,

v.
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS,
Defendant-Appellant.

IDAHO

)

. 41

)
Plaintiff-Respondent,

THE STATE

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CANYON COUNTY

CR

1

APPELLANT'S BRI
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVI

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Matthew 0. Brooks asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 77 (Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2014) (hereinafter,
Opinion). He submits that this Court should exercise its review authority in this case
because the Opinion is inconsistent with precedent from this Court and prior decisions
of the Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Opinion does not, as required by this Court in
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011 ), give
the word "and" in Idaho Code § 49-808(2) its "plain, usual, and ordinary meaning."

1

of probation on

GOU

court

further

ings.

Trooper Blake Higley of the Idaho State Police testified that, while he was on
duty in his patrol vehicle on Interstate 84 in Canyon County, he saw a blue car driving
approximately sixty miles

hour in a seventy-five mile per hour zone, and then

approximately fifty-five miles per hour in a sixty-five mile per hour zone. (Tr., Aug. ·16,
201
is

p.5,

1

p.9, L.20

eighty feet per

p.10, L.22, p.1

Ls.6-12.) Driving fifty-five miles an hour

. (R., p.85 & n.1;

see Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.19, Ls.1-6.)

The officer subsequently observed the driver of the car "make a lane change,
activate his signal approximately less than two seconds, and move over in the slow
lane." (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.13, Ls.18-20.) According to Trooper Higley, "The vehicle
department and Idaho Code requires a vehicle making a lane change, left or right,
entering an on ramp from the interstate requires them to signal for not less than five
continuous seconds."

(Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.13, Ls.13-17.)

He was referring to

1.C. § 49-808(2}. (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.13, Ls.21-23.)
Trooper Higley then initiated a traffic stop and pulled over the blue car.

(See

Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.13, L.9- p.14, L.18.) He approached on the passenger side of the
vehicle, helped the driver, Mr. Brooks, push down the window, and looked inside the
car. (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.15, Ls.3-9, p.19, L.23 - p.20, L.10.) The lane change was
the only reason Trooper Higley pulled over the blue car, and the officer told Mr. Brooks

2

him over

'16,

p.14,

1 18,

When Trooper Higley looked inside the
passenger

he immediately saw on the
couple of

an open cigarette box with

in it.

More

importantly than that there was a small plastic bag which contained a clear crystal
substance." (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.15, Ls.1-16;

see Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.24, Ls.6-12.)

The officer believed that the crystal substance inside the plastic was methamphetamine.
(Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.16, Ls.13-17.)
Mr. Brooks. (Tr., Aug. 16, 201

He then seized the cigarette box and arrested

p.17, Ls.13-18;

see R., p.8; Tr., Aug. 1

2012, p.38,

Ls.1
The

filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr.

crime of possession of a controlled substance, felony, in violation

committed the
Idaho Code §

2732(c)(1 ). (R., pp.9-10.) After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable
cause and bound Mr. Brooks over to the district court.

(R., pp.14-15.)

The State

subsequently filed an Information charging Mr. Brooks with the above offense.
(R., pp.16-17.) He entered a plea of not guilty. (R., p.19.)
Mr. Brooks then filed a Motion to Suppress, requesting an order suppressing all
evidence obtained by the State as a result of an unlawful search and seizure of
Mr. Brooks and his vehicle.

(R., pp.21-25.)

He also filed a Memorandum of Law in

Support of the Motion to Suppress, requesting that the district court suppress the
evidence based upon legal precedents including the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.26-32.) The
State subsequently filed an Objection to Motion to Suppress Evidence. (R., pp.34-39.)
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At

on the

I.

§
when

position. 1

is both on a controlled-access highway and turning from a

(Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.40, Ls.2-10.) In any other instance, the statute only required a
signal for not

than 100 feet before turning.

(Tr., Aug 16, 2012, p.41, Ls.2-3.)

Thus, Mr. Brooks asserted that he should never have been pulled over, the resulting
search was illegal, and all the evidence that was gathered in his case should be
suppressed. (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.43, Ls.10-15.)
The district court, because it felt that the issue of the interpretation of l.C. § 49had not necessarily been

in the briefing,

the parties

to submit

further briefing on the language of§ 49-808(2) and whether it had

violated under

the facts of this case. (Tr., Aug. 16, 201

) Both parties

p.44, Ls.17-21, p.45, Ls.1

then filed supplemental briefing. (R., pp.44-58, 64-71, 74-81; see R., p.84.)
The district court subsequently issued a Memorandum Decision upon Motion to
Suppress, denying the motion to suppress.

(R., pp.84-91.) The district court stated

that, if the stop were valid, the warrantless search of the car and seizure of evidence
would be justified under the plain view doctrine.

(See R., pp.85-86.) At issue was

whether "the stop [was] valid so that the officer was properly in a position to observe a
particular area." (R., p.86.)
The district court then stated that 'Trooper Higley was operating on the belief that
drivers on Interstate Highway 84 are required to use a turn signal for five (5) seconds

1

Mr. Brooks agreed that Interstate 84 was a "controlled access highway" for purposes
of the statute. (Tr., Aug. 16, 2012, p.39, L.22 - p.40, L.1.)

4

this
(citing
v. locolucci, Canyon County

CR

1

CR 201

1

"That is, l.C. § 49-808(2) requires that on controlled-access highways the signal shall
given continuously for not less than five (5)

" (R., p.88.) The district court

noted that Mr. Brooks stipulated that he was driving on a controlled-access highway.
(R., p.88.)
The district court also determined that "if Trooper Higley's belief that [Mr. Brooks]
was required to use his turn signal for five (5) seconds turns out to be incorrect, his
would most likely be characterized

mistake of

" (R., p.89.)

Idaho precedent had not established whether a mistake of law was unreasonable per

or whether a court should instead use the standard for mistakes of fact and ask if
the mistake of law was objectively reasonable, the district court decided to use the
reasonableness standard. (R., p.89.) According to the district court, "Trooper Higley
had a good faith belief that [Mr. Brooks] was required to use his turn signal for five (5)
seconds and considering the application of this statute by this Court and [another district
court], his conduct was that of a reasonable person acting under the facts known at the
time." (R., p.89.)
Additionally, the district court did not "find any legal precedent to support
[Mr. Brooks'] assertion that the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face."
(R., p.89.) Further, Mr. Brooks' "argument that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot

understand the plain meaning of the statute is unpersuasive." (R., p.90.) Thus, the
district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., p.90.)

5

1

an

Reconsider.

11

the plain

of l.C. § 49-808(2) to require that drivers on controlled access

In the

the district

stated that

Court

highways must use their turn signal continuously for five (5) seconds before moving
right or left."

(R., p.117.)

"Because this Court finds that l.C. § 49-808(2) required

[Mr. Brooks] to use his turn signal for five (5) seconds, the stop and subsequent search
(under the plain view exception as stipulated to by the parties) were reasonable and
Trooper Higley was acting lawfully." (R., p.118.)
The

court then

, "While this

discuss a hypothetical scenario in which Trooper H
Higley was not mistaken."

(R., p.119.)

Memorandum
had made a

According to the district cou

did
Trooper
the officer

correctly interpreted the law, and only if an appellate court determined otherwise would
the discussion of mistake of fact or mistake of law apply. (R., p.119.) The district court
stated that "this discussion is merely dictum." (R., p.119.)
Mr. Brooks later entered into a plea agreement with the State, whereby he would
plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance in this case and the State would
dismiss the consolidated misdemeanor charges in a separate case, Canyon County No.
CR 2012-12215*C. (R., pp.137-41; see R., pp.142-48.) So long as Mr. Brooks had no
prior felony offenses, the State would recommend probation. (R., p.137.) Mr. Brooks'

2

Mr. Brooks also filed a Motion for Permission to Appeal, requesting permission to
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.102-04.) After the
district court denied the motion to reconsider, it issued an Order Denying Motion for
Permission to Appeal. (R., pp.121- 23.)

6

would

the

to

r.

1

R., p.·1
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that Mr. Brooks be placed on
probation, with an underlying unified
(R., pp.152-54.)
probation.

of four

with one year fixed.

Mr. Brooks recommended a withheld judgment with three years of

(R., p.153.)

The district court granted a withheld judgment and placed

Mr. Brooks on probation for a period of three years. (R., pp.153, 160-63.)
Mr. Brooks then filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
in his
the traffic

that the district court

(R., pp.164-67.) Mr. Brooks

when it denied his motion

suppress,

was in violation of his federal and Idaho constitutional right to be

from unreasonable searches and seizures. (App. Br., pp.3-4, 9-10.) The stop was
not justified at its inception because, while the officer initiating the stop believed that
Mr. Brooks had violated l.C. § 49-808(2), under the plain language of § 49-808(2),
Mr. Brooks did not violate that statute.

(App. Br., p.9.) The officer initiating the stop

offered no other rationale for the stop.

(App. Br., p.9.)

Alternatively, Mr. Brooks

asserted that if l.C. § 49-808(2) is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in favor of
Mr. Brooks under the rule of lenity. (App. Br., p.9.) Further, Mr. Brooks asserted that
the officer's misapprehension of § 49-808(2) was a mistake of law that rendered the
stop per se unreasonable. (App. Br., p.9.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals held in the Opinion that the district court did not err
when it denied Mr. Brooks' motion to suppress, because "the plain, obvious, and
rational meaning of the language of l.C. § 49-808(2) requires that a vehicle signal for at

7

(1)

on

from a
Opinion,

is parked)." (Opinion,

Mr.

did

not signal for at least five seconds before moving from the left lane to the right lane on a
controlled-access highway, his violation of the

provided reasonable suspicion for

the stop. (Opinion, p.7.)
Mr. Brooks filed a timely Petition for Rehearing, which the Idaho Court of Appeals
denied. (See Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, Nov. 24, 2014.) He then filed a
timely Petition for Review.

8

Idaho
Supreme

Is the Idaho
of
"r"~"' Court and the Court

9

A.

Idaho Appellate Rules provide that the decision of whether to grant a
for review is discretionary on the part of the Idaho Supreme Court, and that petitions for
review may be granted only "when there are special and important reasons" for doing
so.

l.A.R. 118(b ). This

of discretion is not completely unfettered. Rule 118(b)

provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must

considered in evaluating

for review:
( 1)

Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a
not yet decided by the Idaho Supreme Court;

of

(2)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States
Supreme Court;

(3)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own
prior decisions;

(4)

Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for
the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority; and,

(5)

Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further
appellate review is desirable.

SU

I.AR. 118(b). In this case, Mr. Brooks contends that there are special and important
reasons for review to be granted.

Specifically, the Opinion is inconsistent with

precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals' prior decisions.
In the Opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that "the plain, obvious,
and rational meaning of the language of l.C. § 49-808(2) requires that a vehicle signal

10

(1)

on
on

vehicle is parked)." (Opinion, p.7.) "[T]he word 'and' in I

§

signifies

there are two circumstances and that a vehicle must signal continuously for at least
five seconds when either or both circumstances apply." (Opinion,
However, this Court has held that interpreting a statute "must begin with the
literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus
Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,

interpreting

(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

in § 49-808(2) as signifying a disjunctive choice

either or

both of two circumstances, the Opinion does not give "and" its plain, usual, and ordinary
conjunctive meaning. Put othenNise, the Opinion essentially revises the statute so that
"and" means "or." Thus, the Opinion is inconsistent with Verska and other precedent
from the Idaho Supreme Court, and is also inconsistent with prior decisions of the Court
of Appeals.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
This Court has outlined the standard of review for a motion to suppress as

follows: "When reviewing a motion to suppress, the standard of review is bifurcated.
This Court defers to the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly
erroneous.

This Court freely reviews the trial court's application of constitutional

principles to the facts as found." State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86 (2009).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, over which appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829 (2001 ).

11

United

I, § 1

and

unreasona
officials.

U

.

IV;

Idaho Const Art. I, § ·17. "A traffic stop is subject to the Fourth Amendment restraint

" State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983

unreasonable searches and
(Ct. App. 2003).

A routine traffic stop, typically of limited scope and duration, is

analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because it is
more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. Id. "Under Terry,
an investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts
is, has

which justify suspicion that the detained
in criminal activity."

Id.

, or is about to

engaged

Under this standard, the "totality of the circumstances then

known to the officer ... must show a particularized and objective basis for suspecting
the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
'To meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness, an investigative
detention must not only be justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, but also
must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the
first place." Id. A traffic violation, as an unlawful activity, in itself justifies a traffic stop.

State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998).

C.

The Opinion Is Inconsistent With Precedent From The Idaho Supreme Court And
The Court Of Appeals' Prior Decisions, Because It Did Not Give The Word "And"
In l.C. § 49-808(2) Its Plain, Ordinary, And Usual Conjunctive Meaning
Mr. Brooks asserts that the Opinion is inconsistent with precedent from the Idaho

Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals' prior decisions, because it does not give the
word "and" in l.C. § 49-808(2) its plain, ordinary, and usual conjunctive meaning. Under

12

§

of

relevant portion

§ 49-808(2) provides:

turn or move right or left
warn other traffic. On
a parked
continuously for not
than five (5)
last one hundred ('100)
than

l.C. § 49-808(2).

This Court recently outlined the following rules of statutory interpretation: "The
of a statute
must

their

construed as a whole."

begin with the literal words of the
, usual, and ord
151 Idaho

meaning; and

those
statute must

(internal quotation marks omitted). "If

the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law
as written." 3 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

"We have consistently held that

where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic
evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent
of the legislature." Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). "The asserted purpose for

enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning."

Id. at 892-93 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Appellate courts do not have authority to revise or void "an
unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd
results when construed as written." Id. at 896. "If the statute as written is socially or

3

"A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction. An unambiguous statute would have only one reasonable interpretation."
Verska, 151 Idaho at 896 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
13

it is

judicial"

).

The Opinion determines that "the word

in I.

§ 49-808(2)

that

there are two circumstances and that a vehicle must signal continuously for at least five
when

or both circumstances apply" (Opinion, p.6), and thus does not

give the word "and" its plain, usual, and ordinary conjunctive meaning.

Until the

Opinion, this Court and the Court of Appeals consistently interpreted the
sense.

e.g., Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium

word

or

connecting

or
Dictionary

'and', as

conjunctive.

It

nction

is

or

'" (quoting Black's

(1

"and" in

.1

In re Brink, 117

in 'probable cause to stop

, is plainly

together the words

1

Idaho 827, 830 (Ct. App. 2010) {"The conjunctive 'and' in this

of I

§ 1

2601 suggests that the suspension of a sentence must always be accompanied
by probation.").
Although courts must give the literal words of a statute "their plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning," Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, the Opinion does not employ this rule or
otherwise mention Verska.

(See Opinion, pp.1-8.)

Instead, the Opinion ostensibly

gives the language of § 49-808(2) its "plain, obvious, and rational meaning."
Opinion, p.4 (citing State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999).)
standard from Verska applies, not the one from Burnight.

14

(See

However, the

over

more

Idaho

and

v. Goodlett, 1

conflict between the two opinions.
2003) (holding that, in

event of a conflict between

any
Idaho

App.

opinions, the more recent

opinion controls with respect to any conflict between them). The Burnight standard is in
conflict with Verska because its use of "rational" implies that a court may
statute to avoid irrational or absurd results.
literal reading of the

of Law Enforcement v.

a

also Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96 ("A

is not necessarily irrational or absurd." (quoting State, Dep't

1955 Willys Jeep, 100 Idaho 150, 151 (1979)).

this

Court in Verska rejected "the contention that we could revise an unambiguous statute
because we believed it was absurd or would produce absurd results .... "

Verska,

151 Idaho at 896. Thus, Verska controls with respect to this conflict See Goodlett, 139
Idaho at 265.
By determining that "the word 'and' in l.C. § 49-808(2) signifies that there are two
circumstances and that a vehicle must signal continuously for at least five seconds
when either or both circumstances apply" (Opinion, p.6 (emphasis added)), the Opinion
does not give the word "and" its plain, usual, and ordinary conjunctive meaning as
required by Verska. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 893. Rather, the meaning attributed to
"and" by the Opinion is disjunctive-the Opinion essentially revises the statute so that
"and" means "or." See, e.g., Filer Mut. Tel. Co. v. Idaho Tax Comm'n, 76 Idaho 256,
261 (1955) ("[T]he use of the word 'or' in Section 63-105(15), l.C., is as a disjunctive
that marks an alternative generally corresponding to 'either.

15

(emphasis added);

1 ·1

10

cou

perform this
re

117 Idaho

no incision by judicial

Thus, the Opinion's interpretation

In
inconsistent

as well as the precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court and the prior decisions
Appeals interpreting
Opinion

word "and."
the use of

in§

the

in

1
in

that

kinds

, 111 Idaho

721).) However, to the

)l)

that

(Opinion,

K

interpretation of

in

Mart Corp. conflicts with this Court's later rule from Verska that words must be given
"their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning," see Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, Verska would
control as the more recent opinion.

See Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 265.

Thus, K Mart

Corp. does not justify the Opinion's departure from the plain, usual, and ordinary
conjunctive meaning of the word "and" in § 49-808(2).
The Opinion also determines that the plain, usual, and ordinary conjunctive
meaning of "and" advocated by Mr. Brooks "would render the 'and' in the statute
superfluous."

(Opinion, p.6.)

"If the legislature had intended Brooks's proposed

interpretation, it could have eliminated the 'and' entirely and simply written that, 'before
turning from a parked position on a controlled-access highway, the signal shall be given

16

is

the
superfluous, or redundant."

of the statute if

so that none

Verska, 151 Idaho at 897 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Mr. Brooks' plain interpretation of the statute gives

to the

words or

with the

"and" by
is a

recognizing its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning-that "[t]he
'conjunction

void,

is

"' See Ameritel Inns, Inc., 1
. 1

inary

n

in the

of

that the
id.

Thus,

is

SU

plain interpretation of the statute.
Additionally, the Opinion is inconsistent with Verska

it modifies

plain

meaning of§ 49-808(2) based on the asserted purpose for enacting the legislation. The
Opinion determines that "Brooks's interpretation would mean that a vehicle traveling at
speeds of up to 80 mph-the newly increased speed limit on Idaho interstates-would
need to signal for less than a second before changing lanes," which "would be
inconsistent with the clearly expressed legislative intent of ensuring driver safety by
requiring signals that are appropriate for the attendant circumstances." (Opinion, p.7.)
However, this Court in Verska explained that "[t]he asserted purpose for enacting the
legislation cannot modify its plain meaning."

Verska, 151 Idaho at 892-93 (internal

quotation marks omitted). "If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the

17

is

it

mean

Opinion

in interpretation

of ensuring driver

it

position on

turning from a

other than a

last 100

signal for not

Id

)

traveled
d

if

Idaho
"impossibility,"
or would

is

have

plain
results

authority" to "revise[] or void[] an unambiguous

on the

it

is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as written." Verska,
151 Idaho

896. Thus, the Opinion's revision of the statute in light of

purpose for enacting the legislation is inconsistent with Verska.
Also, Verska requires a court to construe a statute "as a whole." Id. In another
recent case, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "Provisions should not be read in
isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document."

State v.

Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866 (2011) (quoting Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho

307, 310 (2009)). In the context of the entire document here,§ 49-808(1) governs when
a signal is required: "No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle

18

or

u

can
signal."

h

or

until

u

nor

l.C. § 49-808(1 ).

Thus, a

turning from a parked

on any

other than a controlled-access highway would still be required to give an
appropriate signal.
In sum, the Opinion is inconsistent with precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals' prior decisions. The Opinion does not give the word "and" its
151 Idaho

plain, usual, and ordinary conjunctive meaning.

Rather,

the Opinion essentially revises the statute so that "and" means "or." Thus, this Court
should

review authority in

case.

On review, this Court should hold that l.C. § 49-808(2) is an unambiguous statute
requiring a five-second signal only when a driver is both on a controlled-access highway
and turning from a parked position. Because Mr. Brooks did not violate § 49-808(2),
and Trooper Higley offered no other reason for initiating the traffic stop, the stop was not
justified at its inception by reasonable suspicion unless the officer's mistake of law gave
rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the stop.

D.

Because The Issue Was Not Litigated Below, This Case Should Be Remanded
For The District Court To Determine Whether The Officer's Mistake Of Law Gave
Rise To The Reasonable Suspicion Necessary To Uphold The Traffic Stop
Mr. Brooks did not violate l.C. § 49-808(2), and the officer here therefore

misapprehended the statute when he initiated the traffic stop.
misapprehension of § 49-808(2) was a mistake of law.

Trooper Higley's

The United States Supreme

Court recently held in Heien v. Not1h Carolina, 574 U.S._, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014), that
a mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold a search

19

uphold the

was

litigated below.
Mr.

su

that the

misapprehension of l.C. § 49-808(2) was

solely a mistake of law. While the line between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law
"is not always easy to draw," State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 303 (Ct. App. 2010), the
officer's mistake here was one of law. The officer in State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119
(Ct. App. 1999), "was mistaken about the fact of the speed limit sign's location and
the law regarding the speed limit applicable."
(emphasis in original).
regarding the

1

In contrast, Trooper Higley was only mistaken about the law

signaling

acknowledged that

McCarthy, 133 Idaho

requirements applicable to

Mr.

Brooks.

Mr.

Brooks

was on a controlled-access highway, and there were no factual

disputes about his location or his conduct while driving. (See R., p.88.) The mistake
here was on the law generally regarding when a five-second signal must be made.
Cf Horton, 150 Idaho at 304 ("His mistake was not the law generally regarding a
repossession agent plate or its legal existence, but whether, in fact, the plate on this
vehicle was a designated repossession plate. . . . [W]e conclude that the mistake at
issue was primarily one of fact, not one of law."). Thus, the officer's misapprehension of
the statute was solely a mistake of law.
After the Idaho Court of Appeals issued the Opinion in this case, the United
States Supreme Court held in Heien that a mistake of law can give rise to the
reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold a search or seizure under the Fourth

20

1

U. .

in

an

on
a court later determined that only one working brake light was required
135 S. Ct. at

Id.

The Heien Court held that, "Because

about the brake-light law was reasonable, the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at

law.

officer's mistake

in this case was lawful under the

135 S. Ct. at 534.

However, the Court also stated,

"The Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and those mistakeswhether of fact or of law-must be objectively reasonable." Id. at

135 S. Ct. at 539

(emphasis in original).
The

of

the reasonable suspicion

officer's

of law, in light

to

to uphold the traffic stop was not litigated

The parties did not have the benefit of the Heien decision when the district court
considered whether to grant Mr. Brooks' motion to suppress. The district court did not
determine whether Trooper Higley's mistake of law in this case gave rise to the
reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the traffic stop, clarifying that its discussion of
mistakes of law was "merely dictum." (See R., p.119.) The Court of Appeals did not
reach the issue in the Opinion. (See Opinion, p.3).
Further, whether Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution is more protective than
the Fourth Amendment in this context was not addressed below. Mr. Brooks requested
that the district court suppress the evidence based upon legal precedents including the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution. (R., pp.26-32.) This Court has held that, in some instances, Article I,§ 17
provides greater protections to individuals than the parallel provision in the Fourth
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on

our

our
v.

1

Thus, if Article I, § 17 is more protective than

1
Fourth Amend

in this

context, an officer's mistake of law may render a search or seizure per se unreasonable
the parties did not have the benefit of the

u

Heien decision, whether Article I, § 17 is more protective than the Fourth Amendment in
this context was not addressed below.
The parties should be given the opportunity to fully litigate this mistake of law
issue. Thus, on review, this Court should vacate the district court's order of probation
on withheld judgment, reverse the district court's order denying the motion

suppress,

remand this case for the district court to determine whether the officer's mistake of
law gave rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the stop.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Brooks respectfully requests that this Court grant
review. On review, Mr. Brooks respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court's order of probation on withheld judgment, reverse the district court's order
denying the motion to suppress, and remand the case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 121h day of January, 2015.

BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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